

Social Dialogue as the most effective means of combating social dumping and undeclared work in the agriculture sector





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Who is Geopa-Copa?

- ✓ It's the Employers' Group of Professional Agricultural Organisations. It was created in 1963.
- ✓ The 26 Geopa members are national agricultural organizations that are entitled to negotiate collective agreements at national level.
- ✓ Geopa is recognized by the European Commission as the Social Partner representing the employers in the agricultural sector in the **negotiations of European recommendation agreements** on social aspects (art. 153° TFEU). Geopa is also **consulted by the EC** on proposals for Regulations and Directives governing social policies (art. 154° and 155° TFEU).
- $\checkmark~$ It's estimated 20 199 360 agricultural workers.
- ✓ There are **no figures** of undeclared/ illegal workers in agriculture.



Social Dialogue as the most effective means of combating social dumping and undeclared work in the agriculture sector

What? Analyze and study the phenomenon of undeclared work and irregular work in EU agriculture

Why? Undeclared work b Social dumping

Unfair competition

How?

- Step 1: Legal framework & definitions $(\neq$ Under-declared work; \neq Illegal Work; \neq Bogus self-employment)
- Step 2: Control (systems & entities & sanctions)
- Step 3: Best practices
- Step 4: Recommendations



Definition of Undeclared Work by EC & Eurofound

- ✓ Paid activities that are **lawful** as regards their nature;
- Not declared to public authorities (tax and/or social security fraud);
- ✓ Covers a range of activities from informal household services to clandestine work by illegal residents (but excludes criminal activities);
- Abusive behaviour regarding working conditions and/or health and safety norms, leading to the involvement of labour inspectorates.



Illegal Work by EC

- ✓ Employment of an illegally staying third-country national.
- ✓ In BE, FI, FR, IT, MT, NL and SE, illegal employment constitutes a criminal offence in itself.





Undeclared work is a form of illegal work *AT, BE, DE, FR, HU, LT, PT*

Totally Different Regulation (definition & sanction) ES, IE, IT, NL, SE, UK

Quite Confused (lack of both definitions) FI, LV




Bogus self-employment by CJEU

- $\checkmark~$ Person hired as a self-employed person under national law
- ✓ **But** acts under the **direction** ...
 - with no freedom to choose the **time**, **place** and **content** of his work,
 - does not share the employer's commercial **risks**;
 - and is **part of** the company (so forming an economic unit).
- ✓ Some MSs in Europe consider bogus self-employment as a form of "social fraud".



Legal Definitions (at national level)



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Step 2: Control

- ✓ Labour Inspection enforcement
- \checkmark Coordination of Controls at National level
- $\checkmark~$ Effectiveness of sanctions
- ✓ Effectiveness of workers rights (tools)
- $\checkmark~$ Joint and Several Liability at National level



The role of labour inspections

Enforcement (most of the MSs) Promotion-Preventive action (ex. FI, NL, PT, UK)



ex. FI, IE, LT, NL, SE, UK

Deterrence based (sanctions) ex. FR, ES, BE, IT




The role of labour inspections: Preventive measures

- Preventive measures provide an **effective support** for traditional deterrentbased policies which is a key issue to tackle undeclared work:
 - ✓ contractual instruments (by law or colletive bargaining for more flexibility);
 - ✓ simplification of administrative formalities for the employment relationship
 - declaring (employment services, authority, social security institutions, tax authorities, etc.)
 - managing (salaries, working hours, rest periods)
 - tax authorities (single for social security & tax or extra tax formalities)



Formal communication to Public Authorities: How does it work? <u>Declaring</u> Employment Relations






Formal communication to Public Authorities: Formal Errors: How are they treated?



Formal errors are treated differently than Undeclared Work



DK, FI, HU, IT, PT



Formal errors are treated the same as Undeclared Work




AT, BE, CY, DE, ES, FR, LT, NL, PL, SE





The role of collective bargaining in agriculture



New issues related to flexibility (working time, employment contracts, salary, "productivity bargaining");

Good practices of social dialogue and tripartite regulation directed to improving regular work.



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Good practices collected on regulation

General	Good practices
Subject	
 Regulation	ES: "La Comision Nacional de riesgos
	laborales": a case of regulation through
	tripartite dialogue in Spain
	LT: The Tripartite Council of the Republic of
	Lithuania (LRTT)
	FR: The National Convention against illegal
	work: regulatory framework and
	perspectives in agriculture.
	Conač



Good practices collected on labour inspection

General	Good Practice
Subject	
Enforcement -	FR: «Travail dissimulé» and labour
Labour	inspection in France: sanctions and
Inspection	remedies
	IT: Procedural and substantial rights of
	undertakings in case of labour inspection
	NL: The power of SZW (labour
	inspectorate) to impose "orders" for
	recovering of unpaid wages
	PT: Information, advice and promotion:
	the role of Labour Inspection (ACT)
	UK: HSE powers related to non
	compliance of OSH rules and measures
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Good practices collected on enforcement

General Subject	Good Practice
Enforce ment - measures beyond the tradition al "comman d and control" scheme	BE: "Prevent Agri" - social dialogue in OSH BE: Joint & several liability in subcontracting chains FI: Assignment of a pay claim to a trade union and its role of claimant in a trial NL: OSH & industrial relations and the "Arbo Catalogi" in agriculture NL: Joint Committees for restoring fair work conditions NL: A self-inspection tool for the employer (technologies can help self-evaluation on standards of decent work) SE: Role and powers of trade unions in labour inspection UK: Farm inspections: what is the GLA (Gangmaster's Licensing Authority) licensing scheme, and how it works



Good practices collected of regulatory simplification

General Subject	Good Practice
Perspectives of regulatory	CY: The fight against informality
simplification	HU: A case of administrative simplification: the "model employment contract" for seasonal workers
	FI: Collective agreements and flexibility in "working time"
	SE: "the average annual working time" in horticulture.



Good practices collected on collective bargaining measures

General	Good Practice
Subject	
Collective	BE: the "Social Label" in the culture of
bargaining	mushrooms
innovative	NL: "Fair Produce": a social label in the
measures	culture of mushrooms
and	BE: Tripartide regulation for distinguish
contracted	independent worker from employee
flexibility	IT: Gli Avvisi Comuni to fight undeclared work
	IT: Quality Agricultural network
	NL: The Labour Foundation: social dialogue & tripartite regulation
	PT: "2015 Campaign to fight Undeclared Work"
	SE: A Tripartite working group with Tax
	Authorities to tackle UDW CODA

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Legally binding definitions UDW & related issues

Conclusions

- 1. No legally binding definition of UDW at EU levels;
- 2. Related issues: "illegal work"; "illegal employment"; "bogus selfemployment"; "envelope wages"/"under-declared work";
- 3. Not all MSs provide for legally binding definitions of UDW & related issues;
- 4. Some MSs: legal concept of "social fraud"

- 1. Need for shared knowledge of the National binding definitions of UDW & al.
- 2. Need for **better administrative cooperation on transnational work** topics
- 3. Starting a discussion on the concept of "social fraud";
- 4. Stating **UDW causes social fraud**, a damage for the society as a whole.



UDW and National approaches to regulation

Conclusions

- 1. Regulation reflecting the **different political and cultural approaches**:
 - a. (full) workers protection;
 - b. tax (& social security concern);
 - c. Social fraud concern.
- 2. Direct regulation & deterrence ≠ compliance-based regulation & self-regulation;
- 3. UDW & al. are different, not always treated differently;
- 4. A few MSs: (i) graduation of sanctions and (ii) preventive measures.

- 1. promote multi-level regulatory approaches: not only direct regulation/command and control/ threat of sanctions, **but also preventive measures;**
- 2. **Responsive regulatory approaches** are better than solely command & control approaches;
- 3. Sanctions: (i) proportional to specific misconduct; (ii) responsive to the behavior of the offender.



Administrative burden - from regulatory approach to simplification, flexibility & responsiveness

Conclusions

- 1. Too many and too heavy **administrative burdens** do not increase compliance;
- 2. Complex & redundant administrative burdens can cause mistakes in good faith;
- 3. Formal mistakes often considered as UDW;
- 4. MSs (very often) deliver same data to same/different Administrative Authorities;
- 5. Administrative simplification: strategic tool for multi-level policy to promote regular work.

- 1. Promote **simplification of administrative burdens is a priority**;
- 2. Avoid duplication;
- 3. Share information on **good practices**;
- 4. Test existing regulation on consistency with objectives/policies;
- 5. "**impact analysis**": "ex ante" & "ex post";
- 6. Specific concern to very small undertakings.



Labour Inspection and UDW

Conclusions

- 1. MSs \neq on role, powers and tasks of Labour Inspections (L.I.);
- 2. different approaches to L.I. reflect \neq different regulatory approaches;
- 3. "generalist systems" vs. "specialised systems";
- 4. Enforcement organizations & measures: graduation & responsiveness;
- 5. Different nature of sanctions (penal, civil, administrative), but normally pecuniary sanctions;
- 6. Not all MSs grant adequate procedural rights to inspected employers.

- 1. Collect **information at national level of Labour Inspections** procedures/organization/enforcement systems;
- 2. Exchange good practices: top-down & bottom-up;
- 3. Responsiveness of enforcement to the conduct of the offender;
- 4. Proportionality to type of misconduct;
- 5. Procedural rights: ex. (i) maximum duration of L.I.; (ii) document marking the end of L.I..



The role of the Social Partners

Conclusions

- 1. Wider Employer's Organization presence/activity correspond to higher compliance to Labour Market Regulation;
- 2. Collective bargaining in agriculture is very much spread everywhere;
- 3. Some MSs have good practices of social dialogue & tripartite regulation;
- 4. MSs: leave more space of Labour Market Regulation to CAs. Not always Social Partners are prepared to it.

- 1. Recognize and consider social partners as subjects for the regulation;
- 2. **Privilege "multi-level" approaches** to regulation: tripartite regulation and self-regulation (social dialogue);
- 3. Social Partners: free to bargaining but adequately prepared to new spaces left by State direct regulation;
- 4. Social Partners: essential role of sensitization in promoting compliance.



The transnational dimension of social fraud in agriculture

Conclusions

- 1. UDW & related phenomena are present in agriculture in all MSs;
- 2. Social fraud is a comprehensive concept in some MSs has been governed by the law;
- 3. Posting of workers is not that present in agriculture. But in some MSs is emerging as a phenomenon of externalisation;
- 4. In agriculture, the transnational dimension of social fraud is related to UDW more than to fraud/abuse in PW.

- 1. Collect data on transnational abusive/ fraudulent practices;
- 2. EC role of **coordination**;
- 3. MSs: **enforcement measures** on UDW & related issues in relation to social alarm/policies/objectives;
- 4. Farmers: free to benefit of free market, free provision of services and free movement of workers. **Sensitized to practices** respectful of EU/National regulation.



Benchmarking in search of good practices

Conclusions

- 1. Many good practices throughout Europe;
- 2. Good practices:
 - (i) direct regulation;
 - (ii) tripartite regulation;

(iii) self regulation (social dialogue), both at central and at workplace level.

Recommandations

- 1. Adopt "**benchmarking**" in search of good practices as a major working method;
- 2. Collect good practices for the benefit of all MSs and national Social Partners.



Summarizing ...

✓ GEOPA-COPA deplores all practices of UDW and social fraud both at national and at transnational level, as they produce unfair competition among companies and disadvantage to those who comply with rules;

✓ Not more regulation is needed, but better regulation is possible: responsive regulation.





Thank you!

